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Abstract 
 
While young couples in western societies generally form a new household, in low-income societies 
new unions are often incorporated into existing households. However, there is a growing tendency in 
the nuclearization of households as intergenerational co-residence is undermined by growing wage 
labour opportunities that provide incentives for rural-urban migration and because small nuclear 
families adapt better to urban societies characterized by high geographic and social mobility. The 
objective of this paper is therefore to jointly study for a selection of low- to middle-income countries 
the socioeconomic and demographic conditions of women aged 15-34 and their partners in relation to 
their household patterns with particular interest in the comparison of nuclear and extended households. 
The analysis will mainly rely on data from the Integrated Public Use of Microdata Series International 
database (https://international.ipums.org/international/) from which census samples for the last two or 
latest available census rounds for 18 countries have been extracted. Results showed that women being 
of older age (within the 15-34 range) and at the same time having attained at least primary school 
education, having a husband who does not work in the primary sector and who is neither much older 
nor much younger were all associated with living in a nuclear household. However, individual factors 
explained only a small part of the overall variation in the household arrangements of young couples, 
suggesting that differences between countries in these dimensions do not explain much of the 
difference in household structure. Rather, societal indicators like economic development and the 
average age at marriage – that were significant in our models – may explain better the overall slow 
transition towards the nuclear family. 
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1. Introduction 
 
From a global perspective, family formation patterns are not the automatic product of individual 
decisions, but rather fall among the broader set of socio-cultural practices linked to various 
(interdependent) family and gender systems characterizing regions or countries. In general terms, 
family systems define “what it means to be related by blood, or descent, and by marriage; who should 
live with whom at which stages of the life course; the social, sexual, and economic rights and 
obligations of individuals occupying different kin positions in relation to each other; and the division 
of labour among kinrelated individuals” (Mason 2001, p 161). Similarly, gender systems define male 
and female roles and their corresponding rights and obligations (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 1999).  
A brief run through the historical and anthropological literature sheds light on the great plasticity of 
familial systems in the variegated cultures of which we have knowledge (Coontz 2000). This 
flexibility arises in the majority of cases from the necessities of adaptation to diverse environmental, 
biological, geographical economic, political and social pressures (Fox 1967). However, despite the 
obvious diversity in family formation patterns, in the past there was the tendency to equate societal 
models with universal models of the family (Elder 1965; Josephson & Burack 1998). In the case of 
contemporary western social sciences, the prevailing model was (and is) the nuclear family model 
whose members impart the same ideals of democracy and freedom believed to be at the base of liberal 
political and economic systems (e.g. Becker 1991). A crucial difference between the pre-modern 
household pattern of young couples in Northwest Europe and that of other countries (in the past and in 
some cases still today) is that in the former a couple usually established their own household upon 
marriage (Coontz 2005). However, as some argue (e.g. Thornton 2001), generalizing this family 
model to the analysis of other societies increases the chances of falling into evolutionary stances that 
act to distort an appropriate understanding of the phenomenon, as not all societies necessarily undergo 
the same transitional phases.  
In this paper, we take a temporal and broad geographic comparative framework to study the household 
structure of young couples in 18 low- and middle-income countries from Africa, Asia, Central and 
South America where social and economic modernization processes are only just starting to take hold. 
We take a young couple’s perspective as a way to recognize the importance that independent living 
upon marriage has had historically and presently on the nuclearization of households. For our analyses 
we make use of census data and we adopt a multilevel approach to combine in a single model 
individual and country-level characteristics that are associated with the type of household in which 
young couples reside. For the sake of comparability, we contrast between nuclear and extended 
households. Particular interest lies in ascertaining whether or not young couples are moving away 
from patri-local or other extended household forms, and which factors may play a part in this process. 
However, we will not examine specific countries in detail. Before moving on to the method and results 
sections, a few words on how economic, demographic and cultural factors can influence the way 
young couple’s households are structured.  
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2. Societal determinants of young couples’ co-residence patterns  
 
The household typology that is used when conducting research on household patterns and living 
arrangements will depend on both the research goal and data availability, but are likely to contain the 
basic elements of both Le Play’s and Laslett’s classification, i.e. a distinction between simple and 
more complex types of households (Silver 1982; Laslett 1972). Still cause for discussion among 
scholars, however, is what determines societal changes in household organization, i.e. a shift from 
simple to complex (Smith 1993; Thornton 2005). While most agree that the ability of young couples to 
determine their own family life is a key element differentiating family systems around the world, there 
is much less agreement on the mechanisms by which couples attain higher agency and loosen 
themselves from social and family pressures on family decisions. The debate on this topic, impossible 
to reproduce at length in this article, centres on whether emphasis is placed on economic, demographic 
or cultural and ideological factors of family change.  
 
2.1. The influence of economic development on household structure  
Historically, Western countries – in particular Northwest European countries – have been portrayed as 
more egalitarian, less family oriented and more individualistic societies as compared to other 
countries (Thornton 2001). There is, however, disagreement over whether these traits were inherent in 
Western societies before early industrialization (e.g. Hajnal 1965, 1982; Laslett 1972; Macfarlane 
1979) or resulted from changes in production systems brought about by early industrialization. The 
emergence of industrial and post-industrial societies and the consequent breaking of ties with the 
countryside – processes that are now also taking place in low- and middle-income countries – are 
considered by many as the main inflection point in family changes, among others, from the stem 
family to the nuclear family and from arranged marriages to marital courtships (Coontz 2005; Goode 
1963). 
The idea that economic development is associated with simplification of the household and 
independent residence of the elderly became widely accepted in the twentieth century. Mid-twentieth-
century sociological literature highlighted the connection between industrialization and nuclear-family 
structure (e.g. Parsons 1949). Intergenerational co-residence was said to be undermined by growing 
wage labour opportunities, which provided incentives for the younger generation to leave the farm and 
move to urban areas. It was argued that small nuclear families were best adapted to urban societies 
characterized by high geographic and social mobility (e.g. Burgess 1960). By the 1960s family change 
processes were taking place in most places of the world. This led some researchers to conclude that 
nuclear families would ultimately become the majority family type even if substantial differences in 
family systems are maintained (e.g. Goode 1963). 
Since then, academic literature generally supposed intergenerational co-residence to be a feature 
of traditional agricultural societies that declines in importance as a society industrializes, experiences 
economic expansion or high migration flows (Ruggles & Heggeness 2008). Ruggles & Heggeness 
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concluded, however, that despite the trade-off between the costs and benefits of co-residence for each 
generation and the general consensus by others that intergenerational co-residence is declining in most 
countries as a result of economic development, no clear trend in intergenerational co-residence was 
observed for 15 low- and middle-income countries over the last three decades of the 20th century
1
. It 
would appear, therefore, that the cultural indelibility of traditional family systems remain resilient to 
change, an argument that was also provided for the stability in the age at entry into formal marriages 
or consensual unions in Latin America by Fussel & Palloni (2004) despite the significant declines in 
fertility and increases in female education and labour force participation. 
One factor that plays an important role in the dynamics of traditional family forms and ensuing 
household compositions is how wealth, property, and power are distributed. For instance, in the case 
of patrilineal joint-family and stem-family systems these are concentrated in the hands of the older 
generation of men (Le Play 1884; Ruggles 1994; Pottthast-Jutkeit 1997; Shäfer 1997). As a result, the 
younger generation is dependent on the older one, relying on elders for housing, employment, and 
eventual inheritance (Ruggles & Heggeness 2008). However, as populations age and household 
structures simplify in developing countries, this hierarchical structure changes whilst elderly co-
resident parents become more dependent on their children for both economic support and care.  
As expressed by Ruggles & Heggeness (2008), identifying which generation is dependent has 
theoretical implications for the impact of economic development on the frequency of intergenerational 
co-residence. In particular, if the younger generation profits from expanded economic opportunities, 
we would expect a reduced frequency of co-residence in traditional patriarchal multigenerational 
families (but see also Coontz 2000), since the alternatives to familial employment would become more 
attractive. At the same time, however, the rise of wage labour could contribute to an increase of 
landless elderly with no means of support, and the rising income of younger-generation wage earners 
could actually increase their capacity to take in destitute parents. Thus, all things being equal, one 
would expect rising economic opportunity for the young to discourage traditional patriarchal co-
residence, but perhaps to encourage co-residence associated with old-age support (Ruggles & 
Heggeness 2008, p. 255). Indeed, in Taiwan, a country that is undergoing a period of continuing rapid 
social, economic, and demographic change, co-residence of a married couple with the husband’s 
parents continues to be an important aspect of family life despite Taiwan’s industrialization and 
convergence to a Western model of consumption and slow increase in the prevalence of nuclear 
households (Weinstein et al. 1990). However, the timing and duration of intergenerational co-
residence had changed: married couples were more likely to begin married life on their own or to 
separate quicker from the parents’ household. Moreover, taken from the opposite perspective, in 1985 
                                                 
1
 The authors did mention that “four of the 15 countries show declining co -residence of elderly parents with 
adult children, but these are not countries with substantial economic development over the period studied” ( ibid. 
p. 270). However, upon closer inspection these were the four African countries in the sample, suggesting that 
migration rather than economic development per se could be behind this decline. For instance, according to 
Shäfer (1997) the increasing mobility and urban opportunities to earn a living of young Mende males in Sierra 
Leone tend to undermine the authority of the more senior males, which resulted in a decline in the size of multi-
generational family residential units (from as many as 44 members on average in 1940 to 6-8 persons by 1965).  
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about 80% of the husband’s parents was still living with a child. The authors concluded that there 
seems to be a high probability of continuing declines in co-residence as the norms for co-residence are 
gradually eroding, the increasing levels of female education (reducing dependency on the husband’s 
family), fertility levels remaining below replacement and universal health insurance permitting more 
independent living among the elderly themselves. 
 
2.2. How demographic factors influences household structures 
In the past, some historians suggested that the distinctive feature of Western European and 
American history was the early and long-standing predominance of nuclear families. Indeed, later 
research demonstrated that there had indeed been a decline of extended families (Coontz 2000), 
although as a result of high mortality rates and second marriages, step-families were much more 
numerous than we today suppose (Segalen 1981; Coontz 2005). However, the explanation given was 
that as lives were shorter in the past, comparatively few families had had enough living members to 
potentially reside as a multigenerational household, but the ones that did represented a high proportion 
of all such potential arrangements. By contrast, at present a larger number of co-resident extended 
families would embody just a tiny fraction of potential multigenerational households. For the same 
token, the privacy that is greatly valued by nuclear families today is fairly recent as in the earlier days 
it was quite common for servants, borders, lodgers to move freely in and out of the household and for 
more distant family members to visit (Ruggles 1994; Coontz 2000). 
Currently, almost all countries in the world are faced with an ageing population due to declining 
fertility and mortality levels. Although demographic ageing is still at a (very) early stage in developing 
countries, the number of elderly dependents is also set to increase while the proportion of working-age 
adults that are able to provide support will level off or even decline. This means that younger cohorts 
(who progressively have fewer siblings) have increasing chances to live with (longer surviving) 
parents. According to Ruggles & Heggeness (2008) this may cause two types of outcomes: if the 
parent has a farm and the coresident child will inherit, fewer siblings means less competition, but in 
case the elderly parent is destitute and needs to move in with a child for care, fewer siblings mean 
increased responsibility. This would imply that current demographic changes in developing countries 
are substantially increasing the potential for intergenerational co-residence. 
To return to the study by Weinstein et al. (1990), apart from economic factors, changes in family 
structure in Taiwan were also accompanied by fertility decline as fewer or no sons meant less 
opportunity for the continuation of the patrilocal tradition. In turn, a couple’s co-residence status also 
reinforces demographic behaviour: age at marriage was highest and actual and preferred fertility 
lowest among those who always lived in nuclear households as a couple (i.e. also compared to those 
who moved from an extended to a nuclear household).  
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2.3. The effect of the internationalization of norms and values on family formation  
Changes in the household structure also depend on worldwide supranational processes. Since the 
1960s in the US and many countries of Western and Northern Europe and about a decade later in the 
rest of Europe, shifts in values related to family life and children weakened the ‘traditional’ family, 
understood as the nuclear family, an institution that caused interrelated changes in partnership 
behaviour, family formation and fertility. These changes became characteristic of what later became 
known as the second demographic transition (SDT) an idea postulated by Lesthaeghe & Van de Kaa 
(1986) and Van de Kaa (1987; 2004) that describes a substantial and unprecedented progress in 
cohabitation, the postponement of both the timing of marriage and children bearing, childlessness, 
lone parenthood, having children outside marriage, having fewer children, the parallel retreat from 
marriage and from traditional norms of sexual restraint, as well as the increase in divorce (see also 
Lesthaeghe & Surkyn 2006). In particular, the growing search for individual status that has caused a 
shift from family orientation towards an emphasis on the individual has made people from many 
societies move away at different speeds from traditional behavioural patterns and types of living 
arrangements (Van de Kaa 1987; Keilman 1987). 
While progress in literacy and wealth made the first demographic transition possible, the massive 
incorporation of women into formal education systems, b) high rates of female participation in labour 
markets, c) and the increasing autonomy of women over sexual and reproductive decisions, i.e. factors 
related to the role of women, allowed changes in union and family formation and household 
composition to take place (Oppenheimer 1994; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 1995). It was the much 
improved and highly efficient methods of contraception that played a catalytic role, as did 
improvements in medical technology and communication. By no longer being constrained by material 
anxieties and social control, the individual has become more concerned with their higher-order needs 
centred on self-actualization, individual autonomy and recognition (Lesthaeghe & Surkyn 2006), thus 
making ‘alternative’ forms of family and relationship formation more practical, feasible and 
eventually socially acceptable (Coleman 2005). Intimate partnerships and sexuality, but also the 
relationships between parents and their children, have moved away from the realm of normative 
control and institutional regulation, giving rise to the new ideal of reflexive ‘pure relationships’ based 
on mutual consent and the recognition of individual autonomy (Giddens 1992).  
Conversely, early marriage emerges as a common feature of those societies in which third parties 
(family, religion, social groups, state) exert some influence on individual’s martial decisions, i.e. when 
and with whom to marry. As observed by Jones (2010), the wider age gap between spouses in South 
Asian countries reflects parent-arranged marriage and patriarchal family structures, which typically 
lead to young age at marriage for females.  
Despite such global changes, the multiplicity in cultural contexts, societal and economic 
developments and differences in the timing of such developments has meant that inter- and intra-
regional differences in household formation patterns and characteristics of young couples persist. To 
briefly offer an example, while in western countries, young couples are more likely to start a new 
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household, in poorer and more traditional contexts it is expected that one of the couple (almost always 
the women) moves into the household of the parents-in-law (e.g. in much of China and Japan until the 
early 1900s, and currently still common in a large parts of Africa, the Arab world and India; Burguière 
et al. 1996). 
However, little is yet known as to how the internationalisation of norms and values is changing 
family formation patterns in low-to-middle income countries. According to Coontz (2005), while 
many young people in industrialized countries delay cohabitation/marriage and parenthood until the 
mid-to-late twenties (although they are likely to leave their parental home), children are still 
considered insurance for parents’ old age and an important contribution to family savings in low-
income countries. Nevertheless, changes have also been observed in poorer countries as female 
emancipation in Africa has helped daughters or granddaughters (often school-educated) of women 
who experienced the expansion of commercial crops (and thus the decline in the need for family 
labour) to refuse to stay on, leaving the village circle instead. The migration of women to the towns 
has constituted a major phenomenon in black Africa; they are in fact engaged in challenging the 
lineage system, and tradition in general, by acting directly on the logic of matrimonial exchanges (by 
becoming defiant towards marriage and motherhood), compromising marriage opportunities for 
country people and (as a result) intensifying the male exodus (Dozon 1996). Migration may, however, 
not always have positive outcomes as women are often confined to low-grade jobs and domestic work.  
As extended education becomes the primary route to finding a job that provides a wage one can 
survive on, one spin-off of the rise in the age of economic and educational independence has been the 
emergence of a youth culture that crosses geographic borders, as well as some racial, class, and gender 
boundaries (Coontz 2000). New ways of looking at the world can come from the schooling process 
itself, as new ideas and attitudes are portrayed in the educational curriculum, but they can also be 
gained from new access to the mass media, including television, internet, newspapers, magazines, and 
movies (Thornton & Lin 1994). One consequence of this has been that young adults no longer see it as 
normative to enter and settle into long-term adult roles, but instead associate young adulthood with a 
period of frequent change in and exploration of possible life directions in love, work, and worldviews 
(see also Arnett 2000).  
 
3. Hypotheses and study objective  
 
The main interest of this study is to determine if there is a tendency towards household nuclearization, 
i.e. if over time more young couples are living on their own rather than with (one of the set of) parents 
or in another form of extended household and which factors are associated with living in a nuclear 
household. A multi-level approach is taken as both individual- and country-level variables will be 
simultaneously tested. Like Thornton & Lin (1994), we expect that co-residence at marriage would be 
less the greater the extent to which the young couple is exposed before marriage to nonfamilial 
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contexts. As a way to summarize the earlier mentioned potential determinants of living arrangements 
for young couples and on the basis of the data we obtained we constructed the following hypotheses
2
: 
 
1. Age (associated with greater maturity and experience, conducive to behaviour less subject to 
parental control) is positively associated with living in a nuclear household. 
2. Higher educational attainment is positively associated with living in a nuclear household (both due 
to economic and ideational factors). 
3. Women active in the workforce is positively associated with living in a nuclear household 
(increases economic independence). 
4. Female headship is positively associated with living in a nuclear household (increases 
empowerment). 
5. Being born in a different region than the region of residence lowers the odds of living in an 
extended household. 
6. Literature generally supposes that the extended family is a feature of traditional agricultural 
societies that declines in importance as a society industrialize and urbanize. We therefore 
hypothesize that male agricultural employment is positively associated with young couples living 
in extended households.
3
 
7. Extreme age hypergamy (defined here as the husband being at least 18 years older than the wife), is 
positively and age hypogamy (defined here as the wife being at least 3 years older than the 
husband), is negatively associated with living in an extended household as spousal age differences 
are related to the level of authority of husbands (and in-laws) on wives. 
8. Using Goode’s (1963) prediction that nuclear families will ultimately become the majority, we test 
if there is a tendency towards household nuclearization (i.e that time is negatively associated with 
extended households) (country-level). 
9. Economic development (GDP in purchasing power parities) is associated with a nuclearization of 
households (country-level). 
10. A high average age at marriage is associated with a nuclearization of households (country-level). 
11. Life expectancy at age 50 (used as an indicator of the years of life that parents of young couples are 
expected to live) is positively associated with extended households (country-level). 
12. The total fertility rate (TFR) 20-25 years earlier (used as an indicator of the number of potential 
siblings that “compete” to co-reside with their elderly parents) is negatively associated with 
extended households (country-level). 
                                                 
2
 Similar and other determinants were also identified and tested by Thornton and Lin (1994) in their exhaustive 
study on “Social change and the family in Taiwan”. As their study used detailed survey data and ours individual, 
though cross-sectional, characteristics from censuses and national-level indicators, we are not able to replicate 
their study on other countries in the same manner. Nevertheless, despite our more “macro” approach, given that 
we analyse more than a dozen countries at two time points we hope to be able to identify potential factors 
associated with changing young couple’s household structures. 
3
 No internationally comparable variable that measures the degree of urbanization could be obtained due to 
differences in urban settings, definitions and measurements. 
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We confer special emphasis to education due to the significant global progress made in this area. 
The power of the dimension of education originates in its efficiency as a principle of differentiation 
within social structures (Bourdieu 2006) but also represents the access to new values and beliefs, such 
as those prevalent in the presumably more developed West (Thornton & Philipov 2009). It is likely 
that both these structural and ideational elements of education would influence, apart from values, and 
beliefs also family and demographic behaviour, including the propensity for young couples to co-
reside with parents or other family members. Despite differences in the rhythm and intensity of 
educational change, there has been a relative increase in levels of schooling, visible both in developed 
and developing countries (Buchmann & Hannum 2001). However, there are still considerable 
inequalities in many regions related to education access (Lloyd, Kaufman, & Hewett 2000; Kravdal 
2002; UNESCO 2007).  
Besides the fact that someone’s household composition is conditioned upon individual-level 
factors, contextual influences cannot be ignored. In particular, levels of fertility and old-age survival 
are likely to affect the potential of multi-generational co-residence, as well as economic and housing 
factors that may make independent living possible and affordable (or not).  
The consequences of these changes for union formation have not been systematically studied, nor 
their implications in the timing of cohabitation and the composition and residential structure of young 
couples. In this paper, we will concentrate on this last aspect, namely to contrast the individual, 
demographic, socioeconomic and contextual characteristics between young couples who live in 
nuclear households with those in extended households. When possible, for each selected country two 
different time points are taken in order to be able to ascertain if socioeconomic and cultural changes 
are also having their effect on the household composition slowly taking place in a broad selection of 
low- and middle income countries.  
 
4. Method 
 
4.1. The data 
For our analysis we will use the Integrated Public Use of Microdata Series (IPUMS) International 
database (https://international.ipums.org/international/), the most complete database of global census 
microdata available today (62 countries, 185 censuses, 397 million person records) for the period 
1960-2009). It allows multilevel analysis to assess demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and 
trends of household patterns of young couples at two levels: individual and national. Using multilevel 
modelling (logit regression) we will measure the country effects on couple’s household formation, 
observe variability levels between samples and countries and assess how much of the total variation in 
household structure can be attributed to differences between individuals or countries. 
Our primary interest lies in changing household patterns of young couples in low- to middle 
income countries between the 1990 and 2000 census rounds. Individual registers were therefore 
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initially selected on the basis of four criteria: 1) the person is in a relationship (married or consensual); 
2) the couple lives in the same household; 3) the age of both partners is known; and 4) the female 
partner is between 15 and 34 years old. In addition, registers with missing values for one or more of 
the independent variables that was analyzed in the study were deleted. This varied between 0.4% of 
the pre-selected cases in the China 1982 sample to 34.6% in the South Africa 1996 sample (mean 
7.8%, st. dev. 8.5%). Data consistency was checked by comparing the household structure of couples 
where the female partner is aged between 15-34 using the initial and final sample. Results revealed 
few differences (a maximum absolute difference of 2.4% more nuclear/less extended households in the 
case of the South Africa 2007 sample).  
The final sample selection criterion was that data were available on each of the analyzed 
independent variables, which left us with 29 samples from 18 countries (13 and 8 from Africa; 6 and 5 
from Asia and 10 and 5 from Latin America), equating to almost 7 million couples
4
 (see Table 1).  
The analyses are based on co-residing heterosexual couples
5
 and inter-generational co-residence 
will be examined from the young-cohort perspective, whereby the female partner aged 15-34 is taken 
as the point of reference. This female perspective to the study is opted for because it enables a better 
analysis of union formation in general and marital age hypergamy in particular. For instance, if 
couples where the male partner was aged 15-34 were to be chosen, many women would have been 
excluded from the analysis as a large proportion of men in low income countries do not marry until 
their early thirties or marry with women much younger than themselves.  
After the young couples are selected, they are placed in either nuclear or extended households 
depending on the presence of other individuals in the household.
6
 The exact definitions are as 
followed: 
Nuclear: Contains a co-residing couple, married or not with or without non-relatives (e.g. 
servants) and own children. 
                                                 
4
 The Rwanda (2002), Cambodia (1998) and Iraq (1997) samples available did comply with all criteria but were 
excluded due to large war losses and internal displacements which would have had a substantial influence on 
household patterns. Similarly, Palestine (1997) was excluded due to land constraints imposed by the Israeli 
government, while the Pakistan (1973) sample was considered too old for comparative purposes. 
5
 The IPUMS variable SPLOC (Spouse's location in household, where SPLOC ≠ 0) was used to identify couples. 
These include both married and non-married couples as well as those who did not specifically declare 
themselves as "cohabiting" or "married" but stated their relationship to the household head as "spouse".  
6
 The variable was derived from the IPUMS variable HHTYPE (household type) by aggregating the categories 
"Married/cohab couple, no children" and "Married/cohab couple with children" for nuclear households and 
"Polygamous family", "Extended family, relatives only" and "Composite household, family and non -relatives" 
for the extended category. Our definition for nuclear household is quite restrictive as it excludes unmarried 
relatives that are not the parents (i.e. vis -à-vis Weinstein et al. 1990), although domestic employees, boarders 
and other non-relatives are not excluded (i.e. similar to Laslett 1972). However, as the information on the 
relationship between the individual and the head of household is not always complete  or exact (e.g. one does not 
know if the person is blood-related) for all our census samples we considered that constructing a more restricted 
type of nuclear household would yield more comparable results over time and between countries. Neither do 
such data make it possible to analyse whether couples in nuclear units could live in extended units, whether filial 
co-residence obligations to parents are being fulfilled by other married sons if not by the reference couple, and 
whether the behaviour of a sub-group of currently nuclear couples is affected by the experience of extended co -
residence earlier in their marriage. 
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Extended: Contains a co-residing couple, married or not with or without non-relatives (e.g. 
servants) and own children and includes other family members. 
As is shown in Table 1, in most, though not all, countries included in our sample the majority of 
young couples live in nuclear households. This is especially the case in Egypt (90%) as well as in 
Brazil, the Philippines and South Africa where the proportion is above 70%. Conversely, particularly 
in several African countries the proportion that lives in nuclear households is relatively low (just one-
quarter in Guinea). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2. Independent and control variables 
The analysis includes four socioeconomic variables that are known to influence family and 
household formation. Education, measured here for both spouses as the highest completed level, is a 
known indicator of socioeconomic status and earning potential as well as access to new values and 
beliefs. We know that further progress in the educational attainment of both men and women is still 
required in many low-income countries, for which reason it could be an important determinant for 
household composition. For instance, as shown in Table 2, even in 1998, 95.5% of 15-34 year old in-
union women in Mali had not completed primary school education. In comparison, this was just 15.2% 
among South African women several years earlier (and 6.5% in 2007). In most other African countries 
as well as several Asian countries (particularly Nepal) proportions are also high, while in Latin 
America, Brazil is worst situated with still more than 40% of women not having completed primary 
school in 2000. Looking at the educational differences between the partners, we can see that 
educational homogamy is most common, comprising about 60-70% of couples in most of the countries 
and even more where school attainment is lowest.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Female employment status is also included as it is an indicator of female economic status as well 
as extra financial resources for the household. Labour force participation among women is generally 
high to very high in Africa, China, Vietnam and Nepal (between about 40% and 90%) and lower in the 
remaining countries (20%-40%), although there is evidence that in Latin America levels increased 
during the 1990s. Male employment status was not considered due to a lack of inter-country variability 
as in about one-third of the census samples the employment rate was 100% and in just one-third less 
than 98%. Instead, male employment sector (agriculture vs. other) was used as both an indicator of 
traditional vs. non traditional forms of living arrangements and urbanization. Agricultural employment 
as a proportion of total employment is most common in Africa, reaching 83% in Mali and least 
common in South Africa (8%), with between 20% and 40% of Latin American men employed in this 
sector. 
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Lastly, headship was included as a potential explanatory variable of household composition, i.e. 
whether the female partner is the head of household, or her husband, her parents, her parents-in-law or 
others
7
). Besides providing additional information on possible inter-generational co-residence, it is 
also an indicator of women’s empowerment (if the proportion of female heads is high), which will be 
further tested in the multi-level regression analysis. As shown in Table 2, the male partner was in all 
countries analysed the head in the majority of households, irrespective of household type and without 
any clear macro-geographical pattern: both low and high proportions are observed in all three 
continents. Conversely, female headship rates ranged between 0.1% in Egypt (2006), Guinea (1983) 
and the Philippines (1990) and 9.9% in Chile (2002) of all households, while in the Asian countries 
(except the Philippines) many couples have as head of household one of the parents of the male 
partner (usually the father) (up to 32% in Nepal). In none of the other analysed country did this 
proportion reach more than 8%. Few of the young couple households have one of the parents of the 
female spouse as head, although it appears most common in Latin America.
8
  
The analyses also include several demographic variables, the most obvious one being the age of 
the female partner that serves as an indicator of union entry. One should be reminded that censuses do 
not disclose information on the date of or age at union entry. However, it does capture, say, 16 year-
olds who are married or in a consensual union. If we can subsequently observe differences in the 
characteristics of these women by household type, i.e., according to country, time periods, educational 
groups, etc., we are still able to identify risk factors (no negative connotation intended) associated with 
young women living in an extended household. Obviously, countries known to have a young 
population structure also have a larger proportion of married women in the five-year age groups 15-19 
and 20-24. Even so, cultural factors that affect the age of marriage for women also play a role. For 
instance, in recent decades Ghana has witnessed the proliferation of economic and political roles for 
educated women outside the home, “a development that has enabled many to include an element of 
choice in the decision making process on family life” (Gyima et al. 2005, p. 127). This may partly 
explain why just 6.6% of women in a union in Ghana (2000) are aged 15-19 compared to 18.4% in 
Mali (1998) around the same year. Age-squared is included in the multivariate analysis to test if the 
negative association between age and living in an extended household is linear or declines with age. 
However, apart from absolute age, spousal age difference is also a known indicator of traditional 
marriage customs. For our analyses, couples have been classified into hypogamous (wife three or more 
years older than husband), homogamous (age difference less than two years) and four hypergamous 
categories (husband is 3-7, 8-12, 13-17, or 18+ years older than wife). Age hypogamy is rare in all 
                                                 
7
 The variable was derived from the IPUMS variables SEX, SPLOC_MOM and SPLOC_POP (spouse location 
(thus existence) of, respectively, the mother and father), RELATE and RELATE_SP (relationship to head of 
household of, respectively, the respondent and the partner). Couples where both members consider themselves 
the head of the household (joint headship) could not be identified. 
8
 The country-specific pattern of living with parents or parents -in-law is comparable to the one described for the 
headship rates, although often with substantially higher proportions, especially with respect to the households 
where the parents of the male partner reside (results not shown). This indicates that it is often one of the couple 
who is the head of such households rather than a parent (i.e. someone from the older generation). 
13 
 
countries analysed, although least prevalent in Africa (between 0.3% and 3.7%) and most likely in 
Latin America (between 4.2% and 6.8%). On the other hand, age homogamy showed very large 
international variation, just 3.1% of couples in Guinea (1983) but between 30% and 40% in all Latin 
American samples. Only in China and Vietnam is homogamy more common (more than 50%). Age 
hypergamy is most widespread in Africa and least in Latin America and in the Asian countries where 
Islam is not the dominant religion. In Guinea and Mali more than half of the male partner is 13 or 
more years older than the female partner (and in Guinea a third of the husbands are at least 18 years 
older).  
The last set of variables considered are contextual variables, all measured at the country level, and 
whose average values are provided in Table 2: Singular age at marriage (SMAM) is used as an 
indicator of the marriage system. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), measured in terms of purchasing 
power parities, is used as an indicator of economic development. As economic development may not 
reach all segments of the population equally, we controlled for income inequality (the Gini 
coefficient). Life expectancy at age 50 (e50) and the total fertility rate (TFR) 20 to 25 years before the 
census was taken were used as indicators of intergenerational co-residence potential; time is included 
to ascertain temporal changes, and country and sample variances were calculated as a way to test if 
country and sample differences in the living arrangements of young couples remain statistically 
significant after the independent variables are introduced. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that all measures are based on the current status of 
individuals at the time when the census was conducted as censuses are information sources on 
prevalence not incidence. However, despite the limitation of offering little biographical information, 
we strongly believe that the value of the international comparability remains high.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
After sketching the household, demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the samples, our 
next goal is to see whether such factors are indeed associated with the probability of couples living in 
a nuclear household. We first produced cross-tabulations of the proportion of partnered women who 
live in nuclear households according to the wife’s, husband’s and couple’s characteristics in order to 
ascertain any bivariate association at the country level (Table 3). As one can observe with respect to 
the wife’s education differences are far larger between countries than between the education categories 
within a country.
 9
 On the whole, those who completed at least secondary school were slightly less 
likely to live in a nuclear household than those who attained primary school or less. However, this was 
                                                 
9
 Given that levels of male educational attainment are generally very similar (and highly correlated) to female 
levels the former variable was no longer considered in the analysis. Similarly, the female-male difference in 
educational attainment variable (i.e. educational hypogamy, homogamy or hypergamy) was also excluded 
because there were no noteworthy differences in the proportion of households that were nuclear between the 
three categories (the respective country averages being 62%, 61% and 61%). 
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most apparent in sub-Saharan African countries (except South Africa), Malaysia and the Philippines. 
Looking briefly at other variables, women who are head of the household are generally more likely to 
be living in a nuclear household than if someone else is head (the difference is 10% on average but 
reached 57% in Guinea in 1983). In most samples, couples where the husband works in the primary 
sector are more likely to live in a nuclear household than when the husband works elsewhere. As 
regards to women being active in the labour force, in most samples there was no positive association 
with nuclear households. Finally, with respect to spousal age differences, moderate variations in the 
proportion of women living in nuclear households are observed. For most countries, it is generally 
either age hypogamy or extreme age hypergamy (18+ years) that is associated with a lower preference 
of living in a nuclear family than in an extended one, although in some Asian countries (China, 
Malaysia, Nepal) the association is positively linear: the highest proportions of couples living in 
nuclear households are found in those where the male partner is 18+ years older. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.1 Multilevel models 
While descriptive statistics can provide a general idea of the type of factors that may play an 
importance part in determining household systems, most are interrelated and may confound the 
association between one factor and the outcome. For instance, extreme age hypergamy could be more 
associated with women living in extended households because they tend to be younger. In order to 
estimate the independent effect of each explanatory variable and to distinguish between the individual-
, sample- and country-level effects multi-level logit regression was employed and modelled according 
to a binomial distribution as the dependent variable was dichotomous (extended vs. nuclear 
household). The statistical program MLwiN was used. As shown in Table 4 and described below, a 
young couple’s chance to live in a nuclear household varies according to the individual’s, couples’ and 
contextual characteristics. Partial model results are also provided to determine if there are variables 
that are affected by the inclusion of others. There were no high correlations between the variables.  
The first model includes the age and educational level of the female partner. Results affirm the 
first Hypothesis, i.e. that young married/in union women from a low- to middle-income country are 
more likely to live in a nuclear household as they become older, although the speed of reduction 
decreases slightly with age.
10
 The relationship with education is somewhat more complicated 
(Hypothesis 2) as the descriptive results already indicated (women with primary education are more 
likely to live in a nuclear household than those with no or at least secondary education). We therefore 
looked at a possible interaction with age. Indeed, the model 1 results show a positive association for 
primary level, though not for the highest level. Although our data do not capture information on the 
living arrangements prior to marriage, nor on household transitions, the results suggest that having 
completed primary education initially constrains young women to remain in their extended household, 
                                                 
10
 While the coefficient in the model for the continuous variable age is not significant the trend across age is.  
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but once they reach their twenties these women are more likely to be living in a nuclear household 
than those with no completed education, perhaps because of the correlation of education with 
economic resources that makes them less dependent on others. On the other hand, the fact that women 
with at least completed secondary school education were equally likely to live in a nuclear household 
than those without completed education and thus also less than primary educated women, even at older 
ages, may be because education is also a reflection of the economic resources of the elderly parents. 
As suggested by Ruggles and Heggeness (2008), wealthy parents may also be supporting their 
children later in life, something that would facilitate (the continuation of) intergenerational co-
residence, even after marriage. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Contrary to our expectations, being active in the workforce and a migrant reduces a women’s 
probability to be residing in a nuclear household (Model 2 and Hypotheses 3 and 5). This may be 
because in some areas rising female labour-force participation leads to increased demand for services 
that can be provided by elders, such as grandchild care and housework, while migration (especially to 
urban areas) is associated with housing shortages which also favours intergenerational co-residence 
(Ruggles & Heggeness 2008). On the other hand, women as the head of household was associated 
with nuclear households, thus confirming Hypothesis 4. The only direct factor related to 
characteristics of the husband that was tested, i.e. whether he is employed in the primary sector, did 
not appear to be associated with the type of household young couples live in (Model 3 and Hypothesis 
6). However, primary sector employment may not be the ideal proxy for traditional family systems as 
it mainly concerns employment in agriculture and could therefore also be considered a proxy for (lack 
of) urbanisation (i.e. those who work in other sectors may be faced with housing shortages). In terms 
of the influence of spousal differences in age, the association is n-shaped, thus only partially 
confirming what we expected (Model 4 and Hypothesis 7). Couples had the highest chance to live in a 
nuclear household when the male partner was either younger or at least 18 years older than the wife 
and were significantly lower than the reference group (same age) when the male partner was 3-7 or 8-
12 age older. Perhaps one reason for the latter result is because these age differences are the cultural 
norm in most of the studied countries, while a much older husband, an indicator of arranged 
marriages, may imply a lack of choice (i.e. bargaining power) for young women to the type of 
household they want to be living in.
11
 Why wives who are older than their husbands are also more 
likely to live in an extended household is unclear. 
                                                 
11
 A cross-tabulation of the two household types according to age-difference and several intergenerational 
categories of co-residence confirmed that women who are older or of similar age than their husbands are most 
likely to live with parents or parents -in-law if they themselves are young and to live in a nuclear household if 
they are older. Conversely, if her husband is much older, more than half live either in a polygamous or other 
extended household. However, this figure only marginally declines as she gets older. 
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The second level of the model contains several contextual variables that aimed to ascertain if 
factors that are not directly related to the individual also had an effect on young couples’ living 
arrangements. First, time was introduced (Model 5) and from the negative model coefficient it would 
appear that in fact nuclear households have become less common over the course of the study period 
(1980s to mid-2000s) in the countries that were studied. However, when the contextual variables are 
introduced in Model 6 this result is not replicated. In fact, as time is no longer a significant factor it 
also confirms the assertion that was made by Ruggles & Heggeness (2008) that no clear trend in 
intergenerational co-residence can be observed in (the selected) low- and middle-income countries. On 
the other hand, the economic development indicator GDP (controlled for income inequality) is clearly 
associated with nuclear households. The same applies for the average age at marriage (SMAM), an 
indicator of traditional marriage patterns when values are low (Hypotheses 9 and 10). In addition, e50, 
though not TFR (Hypotheses 11 and 12; both indicators emulating the potential for multigenerational 
co-residence), confirmed its negative effect on the probability that a young couple lives in a nuclear 
household.  
We also checked for robustness to see if the results would be the same for younger women as for 
older women living with a partner. Very briefly, results showed that for 25-34 year old women, age 
and not being a migrant were more strongly associated with living in a nuclear household than for 15-
24 year-olds, while educational level, headship and spousal age differences were a more important 
factor for the younger age group. The coefficients for the contextual factors GDP and SMAM were 
similar for both age-specific models, while life expectancy at age 50 was more strongly associated 
with living in an extended household among the 15-24 year olds, perhaps because they are more likely 
to have parents who are still alive. 
Finally, by looking at the cross-sample and cross-country variance, the model showed that 
individual variables only accounted for a small part of the total variance at these levels. At the same 
time, the variance in living arrangements between countries (the third analytical level) was reduced by 
half after the inclusion of contextual variables, suggesting that macro-level factors are at least as 
important in determining young couples’ household structures as individual ones.  
 
6. Summary and discussion  
 
We know that from a global perspective, family formation patterns are not the automatic product of 
individual decisions, but rather fall among the broader set of socio-cultural practices linked to various 
and inter-dependent family and gender systems characterizing regions or countries. One may thus 
form a new household or be obliged to share the household with one’s parents or parents-in-law to 
form a more complex household. Household patterns, are, however, also changing in low-to-middle 
income countries as economies develop and social modernization processes take place, including the 
transition towards individualism and an increasing status of women. One resulting consequence has 
been the diminished role of the extended family, albeit with greater or lesser intensity as considerable 
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inequalities still exist across the world, that directly affects family processes (e.g. postponement of and 
less universal marriage, decreased resilience of unions) and the role of women.  
However, while researchers have identified both macro- and micro-levels factors associated with 
changing family formation, such as the massive incorporation of women into formal education 
systems; high rates of female participation in labour markets; and women’s increasing autonomy over 
sexual and reproductive decisions, the consequences of these changes for the household composition 
of young adult couples have not been systematically studied. While previous studies concentrated on 
intergenerational co-residence, our study has taken the perspective of young couples’ propensity to 
live in either extended (that includes intergenerational) or nuclear households. Moreover, a wide range 
of non-western countries were selected rather than the more common strategy of only considering 
high-income countries.  
Census microdata from IPUMS International were employed to analyse for a selection of 18 low-
to middle-income countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America the importance of demographic and 
socioeconomic factors on two opposing living arrangements of young couples, i.e. nuclear and 
extended households. Female partners are between 15 and 34 years of age and rather than providing 
in-depth analyses for each country, the main aim was to look at the general effect of each exogenous 
variable on the household pattern of young couples. 
Although a large number of household types could have been identified or constructed from the 
census data just two were considered, namely nuclear (i.e. the couple, possible offspring and/or non-
relatives) and extended (i.e. also including other family members). Opting for a dichotomous 
dependent variable has the advantage of being able to apply multilevel logistic regression techniques 
in order to calculate the effect of potential explanatory variables at different levels and over time by 
testing both individual- and country-level variables.  
Based on what is known from the literature on the effect of the above variables on household 
formation, a simple set of hypotheses were constructed. Results showed that as predicted, chances of 
living in a nuclear family are higher for older women than for younger women, although the rate of 
increase decreases by age. Age homogamy or moderate hypergamy also favours living in nuclear 
households. The same applies to women with completed primary level education, although only after 
they reached a certain age, an outcome that is worth exploring in more detail in the future. The fact 
that in-union women with completed primary school education are more likely to live in a nuclear 
household than those without may be because education helps one to find a job (Coontz 2000), while it 
also provides access to new values and beliefs which influence family and demographic behaviour 
(Thornton and Philipov 2009). Thus, in the context of educational expansion, increasing female labour 
force participation but persistent international differences, it may be worth exploring both the 
economic and ideational factors behind the choice of household by young couples in a similar manner 
as recently international fertility change was studied (Thornton et al. 2010). However, this does not 
explain why the highest educated showed more propensity to live in extended households, even at 
older ages, than those who completed primary school. The earlier made reference to Ruggles and 
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Heggeness (2008) who suggested that the wealthy are not only more likely to send their daughters to 
school beyond primary school but also continue to support their children even after they get married, 
suggests that the decision not to live independently is not just based on economics and “modern 
values”, but also on the more traditional values related to mutual responsibility, first of the parents 
towards the children and later the other way around when the elderly parents become more dependent 
on their children for both economic support and care.  
As living in an extended household is also related to having a spouse not employed in the rural 
sector and being a migrant, it would suggest that there is some association between living 
arrangements and urban living conditions (e.g. housing shortage, high cost of living). Indeed, 
household extension is one way in which families adjust to economic uncertainty (Fussel & Paloni 
2004) and housing shortage (Ruggles & Heggeness 2008), while female-headed households represent 
another adjustment to marital uncertainty as women are increasingly able to exercise their right to 
leave a troubled marriage as they become more economically independent and empowered (Fussel & 
Paloni 2004). Because men and women continue to marry, many women end up forming, and some 
heading, a new household. One aspect that will be worthwhile exploring in future, therefore, is to 
analyse the relationship between household type, headship and civil status of both couple members as 
well as the effect of urban housing shortages on couples’ living arrangements. 
The fact that not time, but economic growth and the average age of marriage were associated with 
the likelihood of living in a nuclear household also suggests the importance of external factors in 
shaping young couples households. Nevertheless, the cross-sample and cross-country variance showed 
that the traditional individual-level demographic and socioeconomic variables like age, education and 
labour force participation accounted for a small part of the total variance in the dependent 
dichotomous variable household structure. While significant effects at the individual level were found, 
differences across countries still persisted but diminished when contextual variables were added. So in 
future research we may need to look beyond the classical determinants of union formation and 
incorporate other, more region- and country-bound indicators into the model.  
In light of the ongoing economic growth and social modernization in low-to-middle income 
countries that are hypothetically supposed to erode the operational significance of the patrilineal 
principle because it allows couples to become more economically independent of the husband’s father, 
one might have expected a sharper decline in extended families than that we observed. However, from 
our results and from elsewhere it would seem that intergenerational co-residence constitutes an 
important fraction, in some cases, the majority, of households in the analysed African, Asian and to a 
lesser extent, Latin American countries. One explanation provided by Greenhalgh (1984) is that 
extended familial networks remain strongly based on the patrilineal principles of intergenerational 
obligations regarding the provision by the parents of education, jobs, spouses and the sons’ shares of 
the family property, in return for the children’s contribution to the family economy and support by the 
sons in old age. Even so, an increase in women’s job opportunities and economic importance has led 
some families to actively cultivate female-linked ties in their search for urban housing and jobs 
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(Weinstein et al. 1990). This seems to be particularly the case in Latin America where several 
countries experienced a decrease in nuclear households, but where female headship rates were 
relatively high.  
In the context of declining mortality and fertility rates that is causing populations to age, 
including in developing countries, there are several ways that demographic factors may affect 
household patterns of young couples. Concurrently with the reduction in household size attributable to 
economic development, improvements in life expectancy and lower fertility will mean that more 
young cohorts will have to support their elderly parents as they will progressively have fewer siblings 
and longer surviving parents than their predecessors. In other words, in societies where old-age 
support in the form of co-residence is still expected (i.e. especially in much of Africa and South and 
East Asia), a decline in fertility implies, by definition, a higher probability for surviving children 
(especially sons) to live with their parents. This also applies the other way around: increasing old-age 
survival augments the availability of parents for young couples to co-reside with (which our results 
confirmed for the 15-24 year olds). Conversely, in high fertility and patrilocal societies with emphasis 
on the vertical filial tie, not all sons co-reside with their fathers simply because there is no room for 
them or because the strain is likely to be particularly pronounced if there are several adult sons in 
residence or due to a desire for independence, especially in the case of young couples. In this case, the 
solution may be a household partition by which an adult son leaves the extended family to head his 
own nuclear family (Weinstein et al. 1990; Foster & Rozenzweig 2002; Edlund & Rahman 2005). 
Under this scenario the change in the proportion of nuclear households may simply be a reflection of a 
changing number of surviving sons (due to both fertility and mortality). In the study by Weinstein and 
colleagues (1990), who used survey data, on the household composition in Taiwan they therefore 
analysed the living arrangements of husband’s parents and married sons by the availability of married 
brothers. Unfortunately, censuses do not collect information on non-resident (and living) siblings or 
parents. 
One other limitation of using census data is that the full extent of co-residence practices cannot be 
measured as it only provides information on current, not past, co-residence. We cannot tell from our 
data if couples had lived with one set of parents before but no longer do so because they have died. 
Similarly, couples may be co-residing with one of the parents as he or she was widowed or no longer 
able to care for themselves. Finally, others have used in-depth surveys to capture more detail 
information on family systems. For instance, Weinstein et al. (1990) used a less restrictive definition 
of co-residence, separating the economic versus the associative basis of co-residence. They argued that 
in households where involvement by other relatives is less (i.e. when the pertinent relatives either eat 
or sleep together but not both), they still contain individuals that influence the behaviour of their 
members that using the strict economic definition (as used in censuses) would be excluded. This may 
have disclosed less obvious changes that are taking place in intergenerational living arrangements that 
are nevertheless indicators of social change. Finally, while our study opted for the maximum number 
of countries, the number of countries could be reduced in favour of the inclusion of more explanatory 
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variables, including religion, ethnicity and region of residence as we know that also within-country 
differences exist in family- and household formation.  
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Table 1  
Characteristics of census samples included in the analysis 
Country/year Original sample 
density# 
Women aged 15-
34 & in union* 
 Nuclear Extended 
      
Africa  1890168    
Egypt 2006 5.0% 618121  90.3 9.7 
Ghana 2000 10.0% 97700  38.4 61.6 
Guinea 1983 10.0% 40385  25.0 75.0 
Guinea 1996 10.0% 66086  21.7 78.3 
Kenya 1989 5.0% 57369  61.5 38.5 
Mali 1987 10.0% 72061  44.0 56.0 
Mali 1998 10.0% 79558  49.0 51.0 
South Africa 1996 10.0% 107977  76.7 23.3 
South Africa 2007 2.0% 24090  74.3 25.7 
Uganda 1991 10.0% 123864  51.0 49.0 
Uganda 2002 10.0% 170661  67.1 32.9 
Tanzania 1988 10.0% 163699  46.5 53.5 
Tanzania 2002 10.0% 268597  59.1 40.9 
      
Asia  3014158    
China 1982 1.0% 819590  62.9 37.1 
China 1990 1.0% 1202344  64.9 35.1 
Malaysia 1980 2.0% 13054  56.8 43.2 
Nepal 2001 11.35% 236484  51.2 48.8 
Philippines 1990 10.0% 387620  74.8 25.2 
Vietnam 1989 5.0% 215317  66.8 33.2 
      
Latin America  2134373    
Brazil 1991 5.8% 728789  79.3 20.7 
Brazil 2000 6.0% 757295  81.6 18.4 
Chile 1992 10.0% 95515  69.6 30.4 
Chile 2002 10.0% 87193  71.4 28.6 
Ecuador 1990 10.0% 65085  69.8 30.2 
Ecuador 2001 10.0% 77594  66.1 33.9 
Panama 1990 10.0% 15879  62.2 37.8 
Panama 2000 10.0% 19907  65.6 34.4 
Peru 1993 10.0% 124379  62.1 37.9 
Peru 2007 10.0% 162738  62.9 37.1 
      
Total  6898950    
       
# The maximum sample that the Minnesota Population Center (2010) has available on their website was used.  
* Final sample size included all women aged 15-34 in union and living with partner in a nuclear or extended 
household. Cases where there is no information on male and female education, female employment status and 
male employment sector are excluded.  
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TABLE 2  
Independent variables included in the analysis. Percentages pertain to women aged 15-34 living with male partner. 
 
 Educational attainment wife  
Educational attainment 
husband 
 
Educational difference 
between partners 
 
Emp-
loyed 
 Male 
partner 
works in 
agriculture 
 Head of household 
Country/year 
< pri-
mary 
Primary 
Second-
ary/uni. 
 
< pri-
mary 
Primary 
Seconary 
uni. 
 
Homo-
gamy 
Wife> 
husb. 
Husb.  > 
wife 
   Wife Husband Parents 
Parents-
in-law 
Other 
Africa                      
Egypt 2006 41.8 8.7 49.4  36.1 9.9 54.0  73.4 10.0 16.6  11.6  26.9  0.1 96.3 0.2 3.2 0.2 
Ghana 2000 62.0 31.4 6.5  46.1 42.3 11.6  64.9 8.1 26.9  77.5  56.7  5.2 80.3 2.9 6.0 5.6 
Guinea 1983 95.6 2.7 1.7  91.8 4.1 4.2  92.4 1.6 6.0  49.7  71.4  0.1 89.4 0.3 4.1 6.1 
Guinea 1996 95.3 4.0 0.7  86.1 8.9 5.0  86.6 1.4 12.0  70.9  68.7  0.2 87.8 0.4 6.5 5.1 
Kenya 1989 46.7 52.0 1.3  37.6 58.9 3.6  70.9 8.8 20.2  70.3  42.3  2.8 90.1 0.3 5.3 1.5 
Mali 1987 92.8 6.5 0.7  89.0 8.3 2.8  88.1 3.4 8.5  51.3  82.9  0.3 98.1 0.1 0.4 1.0 
Mali 1998 95.5 4.1 0.4  89.7 8.4 2.0  90.0 1.7 8.3  39.5  80.6  0.2 98.5 0.1 0.6 0.8 
South Africa 1996 15.2 49.7 35.1  18.2 44.1 37.7  68.3 16.0 15.7  41.8  11.7  5.7 89.2 1.1 2.8 1.2 
South Africa 2007 6.5 40.2 53.3  9.5 35.8 54.7  68.4 16.4 15.2  46.3  7.9  6.2 85.8 1.6 4.9 1.4 
Uganda 1991 73.8 26.0 0.2  52.2 46.3 1.5  63.1 7.1 29.8  70.4  75.3  0.9 90.4 0.3 6.1 2.4 
Uganda 2002 58.9 37.5 3.6  42.2 48.3 9.5  60.6 9.1 30.2  64.7  63.4  0.4 96.9 0.3 1.6 0.8 
Tanzania 1988 52.1 46.3 1.6  48.8 45.8 5.3  68.0 12.7 19.3  87.8  74.0  5.0 83.5 1.0 5.2 5.3 
Tanzania 2002 32.7 63.2 4.1  26.7 65.3 7.9  67.0 11.8 21.3  76.6  69.2  5.1 88.4 0.6 3.3 2.6 
                                 
Asia                                 
China 1982 41.3 52.7 6.0  11.1 76.6 12.3  56.4 4.8 38.8  87.6  75.3  1.8 77.2 1.0 19.2 0.8 
China 1990 25.8 60.9 13.3  11.2 68.5 20.3  64.5 7.8 27.7  90.4  69.4  2.5 75.0 1.2 20.6 0.7 
Malaysia 1980 35.8 61.7 2.5  24.7 70.0 5.3  68.5 8.8 22.7  32.0  32.3  1.2 80.3 4.5 11.3 2.7 
Nepal 2001 73.6 14.3 12.1  49.2 24.7 26.1  64.0 3.0 33.0  55.6  55.3  2.2 65.8 0.0 31.5 0.5 
Philippines 1990 19.4 42.2 38.3  23.1 37.6 39.3  65.3 18.4 16.3  25.6  50.3  0.1 88.9 4.9 5.1 1.0 
Vietnam 1989 39.3 50.5 10.3  30.7 56.3 13.0  66.8 11.3 21.9  84.8  71.5  7.8 68.4 2.6 19.9 1.3 
                                 
Latin America                                 
Brazil 1991 55.1 25.8 19.1  57.3 23.4 19.3  67.3 17.0 15.7  30.0  24.4  0.7 91.3 3.3 3.7 1.0 
Brazil 2000 42.5 32.2 25.3  47.3 28.9 23.8  60.2 22.4 17.4  40.4  19.6  3.8 87.2 3.7 4.4 0.9 
Chile 1992 11.6 54.0 34.4  12.7 53.0 34.3  61.4 19.8 18.8  19.9  18.5  3.7 81.9 6.8 5.8 1.8 
Chile 2002 6.9 46.8 46.3  7.4 45.5 47.1  64.2 17.7 18.1  31.2  14.3  9.9 75.7 7.2 5.7 1.5 
Ecuador 1990 28.5 48.7 22.8  25.4 49.0 25.6  67.0 13.8 19.3  23.0  32.4  1.3 88.2 3.8 5.0 1.8 
Ecuador 2001 23.5 48.8 27.7  22.8 48.2 29.0  64.8 16.7 18.5  29.4  31.6  3.9 82.3 5.2 6.6 2.0 
Panama 1990 18.9 49.1 32.1  18.1 47.6 34.3  62.6 17.4 20.1  23.3  31.5  0.8 83.0 5.5 7.6 3.1 
Panama 2000 14.0 48.7 37.3  12.7 48.5 38.7  62.7 17.4 19.9  29.2  23.9  1.5 81.1 6.7 8.0 2.7 
Peru 1993 37.8 26.5 35.7  27.5 26.0 46.4  63.4 9.8 26.9  23.2  36.6  1.1 83.3 5.9 6.6 3.1 
Peru 2007 19.6 28.7 51.7  14.0 25.7 60.3  64.7 11.8 23.4  34.3  31.4  5.4 76.0 7.9 8.0 2.8 
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TABLE 2 Continued. 
 Age  Age difference with male partner   
Migrant 
 Context 
Country/year 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 
 Hypo-
gamy (<-
2 yrs) 
Homo-
gamy (-2 
to 2 yrs) 
Hypergamy    GDP GINI SMAM e50 
 3-7 8-12 13-17 18+        
Africa                   
Egypt 2006 4.7 26.8 38.1 30.4  0.3 14.7 48.4 27.2 7.0 2.4  9.2  5399 32.8 23.9 23.8 
Ghana 2000 6.6 24.1 36.1 33.1  3.1 15.1 34.6 22.4 11.3 13.5  26.9  1207 40.8 23.8 22.6 
Guinea 1983 17.4 25.2 31.9 25.5  0.6 3.1 16.4 26.8 19.9 33.3  22.6  948 47.0 18.5 20.1 
Guinea 1996 19.1 24.6 31.9 24.4  0.6 3.6 15.7 26.5 20.2 33.4  24.3  1198 40.3 18.7 20.9 
Kenya 1989 10.8 31.2 33.9 24.1  1.1 12.7 42.2 24.2 8.9 10.8  29.2  1629 57.5 23.2 23.0 
Mali 1987 17.6 27.6 30.4 24.4  0.3 4.0 22.1 30.5 18.7 24.4  19.7  908 36.5 19.8 20.2 
Mali 1998 18.4 27.9 28.4 25.3  0.3 4.1 23.6 31.4 18.6 22.0  15.7  1122 40.0 21.3 20.6 
South Africa 1996 2.7 19.9 36.7 40.6  2.7 32.0 42.7 14.7 4.7 3.1    8054 56.6 24.5 22.4 
South Africa 2007 2.6 19.3 34.4 43.7  2.3 28.6 41.9 17.4 6.1 3.7  39.4  10538 57.7 24.9 21.5 
Uganda 1991 18.9 31.8 28.8 20.6  1.5 18.4 42.7 20.6 7.8 9.1  31.6  673 44.4 20.9 20.6 
Uganda 2002 14.1 32.8 30.4 22.8  1.8 20.9 43.6 20.4 7.2 6.1  27.3  980 45.8 22.5 19.7 
Tanzania 1988 14.0 30.1 33.0 23.0  1.3 13.9 37.6 24.6 10.1 12.4  24.0  915 35.3 22.1 21.0 
Tanzania 2002 10.6 31.4 32.4 25.6  1.3 17.8 42.1 22.7 8.1 8.0  20.6  996 36.7 22.1 20.0 
                             
Asia                             
China 1982 2.5 19.3 43.4 34.8  2.9 53.3 36.4 6.3 0.9 0.2    1180 28.4 25.0 25.2 
China 1990 2.1 28.0 38.2 31.7  3.1 59.1 31.8 4.9 0.8 0.3  5.0  1862 35.7 22.7 24.2 
Malaysia 1980 5.0 24.2 37.4 33.4  2.0 26.2 45.6 18.7 4.7 2.9  29.9  5654 50.6 25.5 25.0 
Nepal, 2001 10.9 28.8 31.7 28.7  1.2 34.4 47.7 12.3 2.8 1.5  28.4  1068 46.7 22.7 21.3 
Philippines 1990 6.0 24.3 34.7 35.0  5.0 41.3 37.5 10.9 3.1 2.2  23.0  2867 40.6 25.0 24.8 
Vietnam 1989 5.0 26.4 36.4 32.2  3.8 52.1 36.8 5.9 0.9 0.5  4.5  1082 35.7 22.7 24.5 
                             
Latin America                             
Brazil 1991 8.7 25.0 33.6 32.6  5.9 31.7 40.1 14.6 4.4 3.3  20.5  7719 56.9 23.0 25.0 
Brazil 2000 9.3 25.0 32.0 33.7  6.2 31.0 38.8 15.2 5.1 3.7  20.4  8550 55.8 22.7 26.9 
Chile 1992 4.3 21.2 36.3 38.3  6.4 39.0 37.0 11.8 3.3 2.5  32.6  8504 53.9 21.6 26.7 
Chile 2002 3.9 18.3 34.7 43.1  6.2 38.0 36.9 12.8 3.7 2.4  34.3  11936 56.6 21.2 29.7 
Ecuador 1990 9.2 26.2 33.2 31.5  4.7 34.5 37.2 15.0 4.5 4.1  28.9  6026 50.5 23.3 25.9 
Ecuador 2001 10.1 27.7 31.3 31.0  5.3 34.8 37.1 14.0 4.6 4.1  27.9  6202 54.1 22.2 27.4 
Panama 1990 9.5 25.8 33.2 31.5  5.7 30.1 36.2 17.0 6.3 4.8    6568 49.6 22.8 28.8 
Panama 2000 9.1 23.8 32.9 34.2  6.8 31.0 35.6 15.8 6.2 4.6  30.1  8855 50.7 21.8 30.7 
Peru 1993 7.1 25.2 33.8 34.0  4.2 35.6 37.9 14.6 4.3 3.3  29.4  4951 43.9 24.0 29.1 
Peru 2007 7.8 24.6 32.7 34.8  5.1 35.9 36.8 14.3 4.5 3.5  26.2  7884 47.2 23.2 30.2 
                   
 
Source: IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population Center 2010). Own calculations. 
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TABLE 3 
Proportion of women aged 15-34 who live with partner in a nuclear household according to wife’s, husband’s and couple’s characteristics 
 
 Educational attainment 
wife 
 Household head  Employment 
status wife 
 
 Migrant status 
wife 
 Male partner 
works in agric. 
 Spousal age difference 
 < Prim Prim Sec+  Wife Other  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  -19 to-3 -2 to 2 3 to 7 8 to 12 13 to 17 18+ 
Africa                       
Egypt 2006 88.5 90.1 91.9  94.9 90.3  91.0 90.3  92.2 90.2  87.4 91.4  84.2 89.7 90.9 90.5 89.1 85.7 
Ghana 2000 35.9 43.8 35.8  42.5 38.1  39.0 36.3  40.0 37.8  35.4 42.2  16.9 39.4 43.5 40.4 37.5 26.5 
Guinea 1983 25.4 18.3 11.9  81.8 25.0  25.6 24.5  23.8 25.4  26.0 22.6  24.4 28.4 29.4 29.7 25.1 18.7 
Guinea 1996 21.7 23.5 17.9  47.0 21.7  21.1 23.2  25.1 20.6  20.8 23.8  8.7 23.4 27.7 25.3 21.7 16.2 
Kenya 1989 62.7 61.1 31.1  67.6 61.3  60.8 63.1  60.9 61.7  63.7 59.9  52.6 61.3 63.4 63.5 59.6 52.1 
Mali 1987 44.7 37.2 17.7  66.3 43.9  41.2 47.0  44.3 43.9  45.1 38.5  41.2 56.0 55.2 49.6 40.2 27.9 
Mali 1998 49.5 39.3 38.3  71.3 49.0  48.6 49.3  48.3 49.2  49.6 46.7  40.5 63.0 60.3 54.2 45.3 30.3 
South Africa 1996 78.5 76.0 77.1  78.6 76.6  76.7 76.8  n/a n/a  81.4 76.1  75.1 76.8 77.0 76.9 77.0 73.6 
South Africa 2007 76.0 73.4 74.8  77.7 74.1  74.5 74.1  76.5 72.9  77.0 74.1  76.6 74.6 73.5 76.0 74.2 72.2 
Uganda 1991 52.4 47.0 27.3  58.9 50.9  51.4 50.0  50.9 51.0  52.1 47.5  38.6 52.2 54.0 51.2 46.7 40.0 
Uganda 2002 69.2 66.1 41.8  64.5 67.1  67.7 66.1  64.6 68.0  69.4 63.2  55.2 67.5 68.3 67.1 66.2 62.1 
Tanzania 1988 48.1 45.4 29.2  56.3 46.0  46.3 48.1  45.0 47.0  47.0 45.1  22.5 47.0 49.8 48.5 43.7 36.7 
Tanzania 2002 59.3 60.2 38.8  67.4 58.6  59.8 56.8  54.4 60.3  61.1 54.4  38.5 61.3 61.6 58.4 56.3 48.9 
                        
Asia                       
China 1982 63.5 62.9 59.5  87.9 62.5  61.8 70.6  n/a n/a  61.4 67.6  53.0 61.9 64.6 65.3 65.8 71.3 
China 1990 64.7 63.5 71.4  89.2 64.3  64.4 69.7  58.9 65.2  63.2 68.7  53.7 64.1 67.3 65.9 61.5 63.9 
Malaysia 1980 61.7 54.8 37.9  64.5 56.7  54.7 57.8  57.2 56.7  65.2 52.9  53.3 51.4 56.9 61.9 60.5 68.6 
Nepal 2001 52.6 47.0 47.2  83.5 50.4  50.7 51.8  56.3 49.1  47.1 56.1  32.4 43.2 53.5 61.3 64.0 67.1 
Philippines 1990 84.0 80.0 64.6  53.7 74.9  67.2 77.5  71.7 75.9  81.1 68.5  69.9 74.0 76.2 75.5 75.6 74.6 
Vietnam 1989 64.7 68.6 65.8  88.1 65.0  67.4 63.7  62.1 67.2  67.4 65.3  51.4 66.1 69.2 67.9 67.4 66.3 
                        
Latin America                       
Brazil 1991 80.8 77.8 77.0  76.5 79.3  76.4 80.5  78.2 79.6  82.6 78.2  75.1 78.2 80.0 80.3 80.3 81.8 
Brazil 2000 82.6 80.0 81.9  84.9 81.5  81.9 81.4  81.8 81.5  82.8 81.3  78.7 80.6 82.1 83.0 83.3 81.7 
Chile 1992 73.3 71.2 65.7  77.9 69.3  63.3 71.1  69.9 69.5  71.7 69.1  65.1 69.0 70.7 70.7 70.8 66.8 
Chile 2002 71.4 71.0 71.7  80.0 70.4  70.7 71.7  72.7 70.8  74.9 70.8  65.1 70.8 72.3 74.2 72.5 64.3 
Ecuador 1990 72.7 69.5 66.9  70.0 69.8  66.0 71.0  67.0 71.0  71.6 69.0  56.5 69.8 71.7 71.3 68.1 65.3 
Ecuador 2001 67.2 65.5 66.1  70.7 65.9  65.7 66.2  64.3 66.7  67.8 65.2  57.3 65.6 67.5 67.6 66.4 63.4 
Panama 1990 59.9 63.3 62.0  56.0 62.3  60.0 62.9  n/a n/a  63.6 61.6  50.9 59.5 63.9 64.8 65.3 67.4 
Panama 2000 59.6 66.6 66.6  71.6 65.6  65.9 65.5  63.1 66.7  63.7 66.2  61.1 64.3 66.3 67.4 67.3 67.6 
Peru 1993 68.6 61.3 55.6  65.8 62.0  57.8 63.4  57.2 64.0  69.2 57.9  55.3 61.7 62.8 63.3 61.8 60.6 
Peru 2007 72.6 65.6 57.6  67.7 62.6  60.2 64.2  59.6 64.0  71.7 58.8  53.5 62.6 64.2 64.8 63.6 56.6 
                        
Source: IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population Center 2010). Own calculations. 
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TABLE 4  
Multilevel logistic regression coefficients of the determinants of living in a nuclear household (vs. extended household) for young couples in 18 low- to middle-
income countries from the late 1980s to early 2000s
a
  
Type/level Variable name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6b 
M6 age 
15-24 
M6 age 
25-34 
          
Wife Age 0.147 0.153 0.154 0.165 0.167 0.193 -0.033 0.333 
(Level 1) Age squared -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
          
 Educational attainment (ref. = < primary)         
 Primary -0.706 -0.697 -0.691 -0.722 -0.725 -0.687 -0.737 -0.511 
 Secondary/University 0.008 -0.013 0.002 -0.056 -0.084 -0.195 -0.616 0.018 
          
 Educational attainment * age (ref. = < primary)         
 Primary*age 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.033 0.017 
 Secondary/University*age -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.021 -0.007 
          
 Employed (vs. not employed)  -0.166 -0.172 -0.166 -0.170 -0.172 -0.151 -0.168 
 Wife is head of household (vs. other)  0.651 0.664 0.678 0.700 0.750 0.909 0.632 
 Migrant (vs. no migrant)  -0.084 -0.075 -0.074 -0.076 -0.079 -0.006 -0.104 
          
Husband (L1) Works in agriculture (vs other sectors)   0.058 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.067 0.098 
          
Spousal  Up to -3 years    -0.459 -0.464 -0.490 -0.757 -0.495 
Difference -2 to 2 years (reference)    - - - - - 
(M-F) 3 to 7 years    0.174 0.176 0.187 0.316 0.130 
(Level 1) 8 to 12 years    0.168 0.170 0.182 0.346 0.089 
 13-17 years    0.045 0.043 0.045 0.194 -0.023 
 18+ years    -0.230 -0.236 -0.245 -0.152 -0.259 
          
Contextual Survey year (year-1900)     -0.012 0.009 0.009 0.009 
(Level 2) GDP (Purchasing power parities) (log)
c       0.543 0.649 0.553 
 Singulate Mean Age at Marriage      0.110 0.078 0.101 
 Life expectancy at age 50      -0.065 -0.118 -0.043 
          (Level 2) Sample variance 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.022 0.030 0.020 
(Level 3) Country variance 0.396 0.320 0.362 0.350 0.316 0.159 0.172 0.142 
 Constant -1.804 -1.790 -1.835 -2.106 -3.289 -8.046 -4.837 -10.360 
          
 Number of cases 6898950 6898950 6898950 6898950 6898950 6898950 2251157 4647793 
 
Source: IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population Center 2010). 
a
All models are controlled for country effects and census type (de jure, de facto or both). 
b 
The effect of TFR on 
couples’ living arrangements is not significant when e50 is replaced by TFR; 
c
 Controlled for income inequality (Gini); in bold, significant at p<0.05, in italics, significant at p<0.10. 
